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"What is happening in Haiti could take place tomorrow anywhere else" in Latin America, warned
Jean Bertrand Aristide, the overthrown Haitian president, in a recent interview given from his
suite in the Caracas Hilton hotel. Since his ouster in a bloody military coup on September 30, the
charismatic Haitian leader has been heading a government-in-exile out of the Venezuelan capital, as
Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez's guest of honor.
As Aristide's admonishment suggests, the significance of the Haitian coup transcends the borders
of that tiny Caribbean nation. The installation of a popular, leftist government in Haiti following
democratic elections held in December 1990 was referred to at the time as the "first revolution of the
post-Cold War world."
Now, the coup that sent Aristide into exile, and which left at least 1,000 Haitians dead and led tens
of thousands to flee the country, has the tragic distinction of constituting the first military takeover
in Latin America in the 1990s, after a decade of "redemocratization." Ultimately at stake in Haiti is
the very possibility for achieving social change in the hemisphere through democratic means in the
post-Cold War era.
Democratization and a new civilian left in Latin America During the 1980s, the military regimes
that had seized power throughout Latin America in the preceding two decades gave way to elected
civilian administrations through so-called "transitions to democracy."
With few exceptions, however, the civilians that took over from the dictatorships of the 1970s were
conservative politicians drawn from traditional elite groups who were unable, or unwilling, to
challenge their military predecessors or to effect basic changes in entrenched systems of social
injustice and economic inequality.
A defining feature of this restoration of representative democracy in the 1980s was, therefore,
the preservation of repressive military institutions and the postponement of social and economic
transformation throughout a continent characterized by what have been, historically, quite
undemocratic societies marked by great disparities in wealth and power.

An emergent 'New Left'
The emergence of new civilian governments and the return to electoral politics have been paralleled
by another new development. The end of the Cold War and the "Soviet strategic threat," the
upsurge of mass democratic struggles around the world, the newfound legitimacy of electoral
processes, and international participation in the resolution of local conflicts have all helped give
birth in recent years to a new Latin America left. This emergent "New Left," committed to pressing
for democratization and social justice through peaceful means, is gaining stature and influence in
post-Cold War Latin American politics. In South and Central America, guerrilla groups substituting
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weapons with participation in the legal political arena, and new leftist political parties and mass
social movements are burgeoning.
This New Left includes revolutionary insurgencies such as the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in Guatemala,
and the M-19 and other former and current guerrilla groups in Colombia. It also involves broadbased mass parties and coalitions, ranging from Brazil's formidable Workers Party (PT), to the Broad
Front in Uruguay, the Democratic Party of the Revolution in Mexico, and the Movement Towards
Socialism (MAS) in Venezuela. And it includes the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) of
Nicaragua.
The New Left is hardly arguing that the "new world order" has rendered popular struggles
and revolutionary aspirations obsolete. Instead, such organizations are proposing that recent
developments internationally in a new historic context have opened the possibility for social
confrontation to take place exclusively on the political terrain, devoid of a military dimension, and
that meaningful social change can be achieved through battles waged within the realm of civilian
societies liberated from any form of military influence.
This is an arena where the left may press for change through mass mobilization and participation
in the structures of representative democracy. Such expectations were boosted by the Nicaraguan
experience. In Nicaragua, the FSLN a leftist revolutionary organization that took power through
armed struggle voluntarily relinquished power after losing the February 1990 elections. And
although the Sandinistas exercise major influence over the armed forces of that country, the
conservative government of President Violeta Chamorro has been able to implement a rightist social
and economic policy package not only without military interference, but with the active support of
the armed forces in the face of challenges to the constitutional order from the far right.
According to Alejandro Bendana, a former FSLN government official and current director of the
Managua-based Center for International Studies, "The Left is taking a hard new look at the meaning
of competitive multi-party elections. "Assuming that the extreme right and the United States also
lay down their weapons and play clean in this post cold War world a big if elections take on a new
meaning and potential. The question we face is if the Left is ready and able to make the transition
to electoral politics under new frameworks that ensure [leftists'] physical safety and a minimum of
political opportunity."

An ever-present military threat
The questions which emerge in the context of the Haitian crisis follows: As long as repressive
militaries organizations continue to enjoy influence and impunity, in alliance with far-right
minorities, how viable is peaceful, civilian and electoral struggle as a means for Latin America's
impoverished and dispossessed majority to achieve social justice and meaningful democratization?
Will popular and leftist forces be prohibited by unreformed military establishments and allied
elite status quo defenders from bringing about any real change, in the event they win democratic
elections in Brazil, El Salvador or Colombia?
From "poverty with dignity" to coup d'etat in Haiti In Haiti, a mass-based popular movement
brought a leftist leader to power. Meanwhile, the repressive military apparatus was never
dismantled, nor even subjected to reform. Aristide, an outspoken preacher of liberation theology,
was swept to power in the December 1990 vote, the first democratic election in Haitian history.
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Aristide ran as candidate of the Lavalas movement, a popular and left-leaning coalition of civic
groups at the center of the uprising against the Duvalier family dynasty and of opposition to the
succession of military regimes which followed Duvalier's departure in 1986. Haiti's poor gave
Aristide a landslide 67% of the presidential vote, compared to barely 12% for the first runner-up, the
US-backed banker Marc Bazin.
During his first eight months in office, Aristide took steps to end military corruption and abuses,
gradually replace the most repressive military and "Tonton Macoute" officers, and reform the
judiciary in order to prosecute human rights violators and put an end to impunity. According to the
Washington Office on Haiti, a human rights monitoring group, the military committed an average 24
rights violations per month under Aristide.
Under the regime of Gen. Prosper Avril (September 1988-March 1990), the average was 73 per
month, and under former provisional president Ertha Pascal Truillot (March 1990-February 1991),
59 per month. Although Aristide had no declared intent of implementing radical socio-economic
transformation, he began preparations for basic social change and development plans in favor of
80% of the population, or Haitians who live in extreme poverty. Aristide's program, described as
"poverty with dignity," included plans for a national literacy crusade and agrarian reform.
The Aristide administration's combined efforts at military reform and social welfare programs for
the poor apparently generated enough fear within military ranks and the tiny economic elite (an
estimated 700 families which have ruled Haiti since the early 1900s) to motivate them to renege on
democracy. A church leader in Port-au-Prince said, "Even though Aristide wasn't in power long
enough to get development programs on the road to help the poor significantly, they experienced a
real freedom from insecurity and military oppression during the last six months."
Another church leader said, "[The wealthy] are terrified that if Aristide returns soon, the poor will
take it as a total triumph and will make more demands on the rich to share their wealth." Haiti, El
Salvador, and the New Left The Haitian experience would vindicate the arguments by the FMLN,
the URNG, the Colombian guerrillas and other rebel organizations to the effect that fundamental
military reform, an end to military impunity, dismantlement of paramilitary forces, respect for
human rights and the rule of law must be negotiated and guaranteed before rebel disarmament and
incorporation into electoral politics. In brief, effective control must be imposed over the military, the
institution monopolizing the legitimate use of force.
According to FMLN leader Joaquin Villalobo, civic competition in Latin America among pluralist
forces "based on confidence in the armies [while] maintaining the anti-civic and anti-democratic
roots of these armies is not a guarantee for anyone. [Only] the pluralist composition and the
direct intervention of all of civil society in the renovation of society's military component can
ensure [military] neutrality" in Latin American nations, and therefore peaceful civic struggle. In El
Salvador, for 21 months the issue of military reform bogged down peace talks between the FMLN
and the right-wing government of President Alfredo Cristiani.
The FMLN has refused to compromise on this point, cognizant of the risks of a Haitian-style military
coup in the event of rebel demobilization and participation in electoral politics prior to military
reform. The Salvadoran insurgents were finally able to secure agreement on reforms, including
constitutional amendments which eliminate military impunity and prerogatives in government
and civil society and establish a new military doctrine limiting the military's role to defense of
national sovereignty and territorial integrity from external aggression. The reforms also include the
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reduction and reorganization of the military and rebel participation in a new civilian police force.
These minimal guarantees made possible a definitive peace, brokered by the United Nations, on
Dec. 31, 1991.
Ruben Zamora, leader of the left of center Democratic Convergence party coalition and former
civilian rebel ally, said, "The new framework will be one in which the military does not determine
politics, but civilians and political parties do." The peace accord if faithfully implemented would
reverse 60 years of military dominance over Salvadoran society. This phenomenon in itself
constitutes a virtual Salvadoran social revolution for the 1990s, whether or not the FMLN actually
wins control over the government through elections. In addition, it means that if the FMLN or a
leftist coalition wins democratic elections, such a government would not have to fear ouster by a
military coup.
Meanwhile, Nicaragua is the only Latin American society that has been liberated from the military.
In no other country does the left enjoy the freedom to take advantage of representative democracy
to pursue peaceful change without fear. Talks between the URNG and the Guatemalan government,
for instance, have stagnated due to government insistence that the insurgents disarm and join the
established political system before any military or other reforms are contemplated.
In neighboring Honduras, the Cinchoneros and five other guerrilla organizations which disarmed
and joined the legal political process in 1991 are now demanding guarantees similar to those won in
El Salvador. In Colombia, the former M-19 guerrilla group disarmed in March 1990 to have a go at
legal politics, and has gained important political ground in that country's previously iron-clad twoparty political system.
However, over 2,000 members of the Patriotic Union (UP), a leftist party coalition, have been
assassinated in recent years by rightist paramilitary squads linked to government security forces.
Given such right-wing terrorism, an estimated 8,000 rebels pertaining to other insurgent groups,
organized under the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator (CGSB), are insisting on dismantlement of
paramilitary groups and human rights guarantees before cease-fire and disarmament.
The PT's charismatic leader "Lula" came within a few percentage points of winning the 1989
presidential elections in Brazil, and the party stands a good chance of winning the 1994 national
elections. The military remains largely unreformed since returning the government to civilians after
25 years of dictatorship.
In Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay, popular social movements, trade unions, and leftist parties
committed to civic and electoral struggle are organizing and gradually regaining influence under the
shadow of military organizations which still enjoy impunity and substantial influence. The specter
of Haiti thus weighs heavily over Latin America. It is not only a reflection of the precarious state of
Latin American democracy, but also an ominous harbinger for the new civilian left.

-- End --

©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 4 of 4

